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Abstract. Synergies between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics
have significantly improved our understanding of public cooperation in structured
populations. Multiplex networks, in particular, provide the theoretical framework
within network science that allows us to mathematically describe the rich structure of
interactions characterizing human societies. While research has shown that multiplex
networks may enhance the resilience of cooperation, the interplay between the overlap
in the structure of the layers and the control parameters of the corresponding games
has not yet been investigated. With this aim, we consider here the public goods game
on a multiplex network, and we unveil the role of the number of layers and the overlap
of links, as well as the impact of different synergy factors in different layers, on the
onset of cooperation. We show that enhanced public cooperation emerges only when a
significant edge overlap is combined with at least one layer being able to sustain some
cooperation by means of a sufficiently high synergy factor. In the absence of either
of these conditions, the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks is determined
by the bounds of traditional network reciprocity with no enhanced resilience. These
results caution against overly optimistic predictions that the presence of multiple social
domains may in itself promote cooperation, and they help us better understand the
complexity behind prosocial behavior in layered social systems.
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1. Introduction
Human cooperation is an evergreen puzzle [1], at the heart of which is the divide between
the Darwinian desire to maximize personal benefits and our social instincts that dictate
prosocial behavior. The later are particularly strong in humans, because without their
evolution we would have had serious challenges in rearing offspring that survived [2],
and as a results would have likely died out as a species. Instead, we have acquired
remarkable other-regarding abilities that have propelled us to dominance over all the
other animals, to the point where today the biggest threat to us is ourselves.
The theoretical framework used most frequently to study cooperation among selfish
individuals is evolutionary game theory [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], where the concept of a social
dilemma captures the essence of the problem. In short, cooperation is costly, and
it therefore weighs heavily on individual wellbeing and prosperity. One is thus torn
between doing what is best for the society, and doing what is best for oneself. The public
goods game is particularly apt in describing the dilemma [8, 9]. The game is played
in groups, where individuals can decide between cooperation and defection. Those
that decide to cooperate contribute an amount to the common pool, while defectors
contribute nothing. All the contributions are multiplied by a synergy factor that takes
into account the added value of a group effort, and the resulting public goods are
divided equally among all group members irrespective of their strategy. Clearly the
best individual strategy is defection. But if everybody decides to defect there will be
no public goods. In order to avoid the tragedy of the commons in a society cooperation
is thus needed [10].
While the evolution of cooperation has been studied at great lengths in biology
and sociology [11, 12], the problem became attractive for physicists after the discovery
of network reciprocity [13], which manifests as the formation of resilient cooperative
clusters in a structured population [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31]. Cooperators in the interior of such clusters can survive at conditions that
do not sustain cooperation in well-mixed populations. In fact, methods of statistical
physics have recently been applied to subjects that, in the traditional sense, could be
considered as out of scope. Statistical physics of social dynamics [32], of evolutionary
games in structured populations [33, 34, 35, 36], of crime [37, 38], and of epidemic
processes and vaccination [39, 40], are only some examples of this exciting development.
An important enabler for this has been the coming of age of network science [41],
which has been going from strength to strength during the past decade and a half
[42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 41], providing key theoretical foundations for modeling social
systems.
We are here concerned with the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks,
which have, together with the closely related multilayer and interdependent networks,
recently emerged as the new frontier in network science [49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55,
56, 47, 48]. Indeed, multiplex networks are able to account for the variety of different
social contexts an individual may be involved in, and are thus crucial for an in-depth
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understanding of human cooperation across different interaction layers [36]. Several
mechanisms have already been discovered by means of which the interdependence
between different networks or network layers may help to increase the resilience of
cooperation and resolve social dilemmas [57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68,
69]. Interdependent network reciprocity is one example, which requires simultaneous
formation of correlated cooperative clusters on two or more networks [61]. Other
mechanisms that promote cooperation beyond the bounds of traditional network
reciprocity include non-trivial organization of cooperators across the network layers
[58], probabilistic interconnectedness [60], information transmission between different
networks [63], as well as self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks
by means of coevolution [64].
Previous research has thus shown that multiplex networks may enhance the
resilience of cooperation, but the key determinants of this, especially in terms of the
topological overlap between the network layers and the game parametrization on each
individual layer, still need to be determined. By studying the public goods game in a
multiplex of regular random graphs, we here show that enhanced public cooperation
requires significant edge overlap, combined with at least one layer being able to sustain
some cooperation by means of a sufficiently high synergy factor. The details of this
conclusion depend further on the number of layers forming the multiplex, and on
other properties of the spatiotemporal evolutionary dynamics, which includes pattern
formation and spontaneous symmetry breaking across the layers. As we will show,
these results provide a deeper understanding of the complexity behind cooperation
in multiplex networks, and as such they have important implications for promoting
prosocial behavior in different but linked social contexts.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We present the definition of the public
goods game in the multiplex and the details of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure
in Section II. Main results are presented in Section III. We conclude with the summary
of the results and a discussion of their implications in Section IV.
2. Public goods game in the multiplex
In the public goods game players, belonging to a group of size G, are asked to contribute
to a common pool. Cooperators contribute with a token d, typically d = 1, whereas
defectors do not contribute at all. The amount of tokens in the pool is multiplied
by a synergy factor r, and the resulting amount is divided equally among all players.
Cooperators thus obtain a payoff d(NC ·r/G−1), while defectors get dNC ·r/G, where NC
is the number of cooperators in the group. When the game is played on multiple rounds,
players choose to cooperate or defect at each iteration, based on the success of the two
strategies. The game can be implemented on structured populations, where players are
placed on the nodes of a graph and interact through their links. The results usually
show that, while in well-mixed populations cooperators extinguish quickly, repeated
local interactions among the same players allow the formation of clusters of cooperators
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which are able to survive [70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75].
In real situations, individuals are typically involved in strategic choices on
independent domains, and can adopt different strategies according to the specific
domain. However, information on the earnings of each individual might be only be
available at the aggregate level, as a sum the payoff obtained as a result of all its
decisions. More formally, in order to take this into account, we consider here a
population ofN individuals playing the public goods game on theM layers of a multiplex
network. In particular, we model each layer as a regular random graph with degree
k = 4. Hence the game is played in groups each of size G = k + 1. The state of a
player i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , is fully described by a vector of strategies si = {s[1]i , . . . , s[M ]i },
such that at each layer α, α = 1, 2, . . . ,M , the player can independently choose to
either cooperate, i.e., s
[α]
i = +1, or defect, i.e., s
[α]
i = −1. The benefit of synergy among
individuals in general depends on the specific domain. In order to model this feature, we
assume that the synergy factor can be different from layer to layer. We hence consider
a synergy factor vector r = {r[1], . . . , r[M ]}. On each layer α, player i earns the payoff
pi
[α]
i , such that i gains d(NC · r[α]/G− 1) if it cooperates, or otherwise dNC · r[α]/G, if it
defects.
The public goods game is simulated by a Monte Carlo method (for a fast
implementation using parallel computing see Ref. [76]) in which, at each elementary
step, a layer α is selected, and then a randomly chosen node i, and one of its neighbors
j on that layer, are considered. Both i and j play the game on all the layers, thereby
obtaining respectively payoffs pii =
∑M
α=1 pi
[α]
i and pij =
∑M
α=1 pi
[α]
j . Finally, player i
compares its payoff to that of player j, and copies the strategy of player i, but only at
the layer α, with a probability given by a Fermi function:
W (s
[α]
i → s[α]j ) =
(
1 + exp
[pij − pii
K
])−1
, (1)
where K quantifies the contribution of random fluctuations to the strategy adoption
[71, 77]. In the K → 0 limit, player j copies the strategy of player i if and only if
pii > pij. Conversely, in the K →∞ limit, payoff differences cease to matter and i copies
the strategy of j with a probability equal to 0.5. Between these two extreme cases, for
intermediate values of K, players with a higher payoff will be readily imitated, although
the strategy of under-performing players may also be occasionally adopted to mimic, for
example, errors in the decision making, imperfect information and external influences
that may adversely affect the evaluation of an opponent. We adopt the value K = 0.5
without loss of generality, as shown in [71]. In our simulations, we obtain one full Monte
Carlo step (MCS) by repeating M×N times the elementary steps described above, thus
giving a chance to every player to change its strategy on all the layers once on average.
In order to characterize the outcomes of our evolutionary dynamics model, we
introduce the vector c = {c[1], . . . , c[M ]}, where c[α] is the fraction of cooperators at layer
α in the stationary state, i.e., when the average over time of this quantity becomes time
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independent. As a first order parameter we consider then the quantity
c =
1
M
M∑
α=1
c[α], (2)
which is the overall fraction of cooperators across all the layers of the multiplex in the
stationary state. We note that 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, where c = 1 corresponds to full cooperation
while c = 0 corresponds to full defection. As a second order parameter, we define the
average coherence ξ of the players across all the layers, defined as:
ξ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi ξi =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
α=1
s
[α]
i
∣∣∣∣∣ (3)
where ξi is the coherence of the strategies of player i. A value ξi = 1 indicates that
player i is maximally coherent, meaning it adopts the same strategy in all the layers.
Conversely, ξi = 0 means that player i is maximally incoherent, adopting s
[α]
i = +1 just
as often as s
[α]
i = −1 across the M different layers. A similar definition of coherence for
the particular case M = 2 has been reported in Ref. [78]. In addition to the two main
order parameters c and ξ, when M = 2, we will also use the quantities c[2] − c[1] and
|c[2] − c[1]| to evaluate differences in the level of cooperation at the two layers. In fact,
as we will show in the following, there exist indeed regions in the parameter space of
our model such that full cooperation is observed at the layer with the highest synergy
factor, while the layer with the lower synergy factor is in a full defection state. Also,
a multiplex network with two layers may exhibit spontaneous symmetry breaking, such
that, even if the two layers are characterized by the same synergy factor and the same
interaction network topology, the level of cooperation on them can be different.
3. Results
We implement our model on a multiplex network in which it is possible to tune the
similarity among the topology of the M layers. We therefore consider that each layer
is a regular random graph with N = 104 nodes and K = 2 · 104 links, and we tune the
average edge overlap ω of the multiplex [52, 54]. Such overlap is defined as the average
of all the edge overlaps computed between pairs of layers ω = 2
M(M−1)
∑M
α,β>α ω
[α,β],
where:
ω[α,β] =
∑
i,j>i a
[α]
ij a
[β]
ij∑
i,j>i(a
[α]
ij + a
[β]
ij − a[α]ij a[β]ij )
. (4)
When all layers are equal the topological overlap is maximum and ω = 1. Conversely, if
there are no pairs which are connected on more than one layer, the overlap is minimum
and ω = 0. We begin by assuming that the synergy factor used for the public goods
game is the same at each layer, namely we set r[α] = r ∀α. Initially, each layer is
populated by the same proportion of cooperators and defectors, distributed uniformly
at random, and subsequently the game is iterated in time according to the Monte Carlo
simulation procedure described in Section II. Results presented in Fig. 1 are shown
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Figure 1. Number of layers and topological overlap are crucial to lower the critical
value of the synergy factor needed for cooperators to survive. (a,b) The multiplex is
formed by M regular random graphs with degree k = 4, and edge overlap respectively
equal to ω = 1 (a,b) and ω = 0 (c,d). We show the average fraction of cooperators
across the whole multiplex c (a,c) and the average coherence of the players across all
the layers ξ (b,d) as a function of the synergy factor r, and for different values of M .
Insets show the number of full Monte Carlo steps T needed for the system to reach an
absorbing phase with either all cooperators or all defectors.
separately in two rows, respectively for the case ω = 1 [panels (a) and (b)] and the case
ω = 0 [panels (c) and (d)]. Looking at panels (a) and (b), it can be observed that the
larger the value of M , the lower the critical value of the synergy factor that is needed to
sustain cooperation. When M = 1, on a single-layer regular random graph, the critical
value is equal to rc = 3.75, which is in agreement with traditional network reciprocity
[71]. When ten layers form the multiplex, however, the critical value drops to as low as
rc = 2.35. The minimal coherence also emerges at ever lower values of r as M increases,
and the minima become lower, indicating that at least some layers are able to sustain
cooperation even though in the majority the players defect.
The evolutionary outcomes are significantly different in panels (c) and (d), where
the topological overlap is zero. It can be observed that the increase in M does nothing to
reduce the critical values of r needed to sustain cooperation. In fact, rc = 3.75 that is due
to traditional single-layer network reciprocity always emerges as the necessary condition
for public cooperation. Not surprisingly, the minimal coherence also occurs at the same
value or r regardless of M . The minima become lower as M increases because the
average goes over more layers, simply giving statistically more opportunity for players
to hold different strategies across different layers. Taken together, these results show
that topological overlap is essential for enhanced multiplex network reciprocity to take
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Figure 2. Benefits to public cooperation in a multiplex network with M = 2 layers
and a tunable value of edge overlap ω. The synergy factor used for the public goods
game is the same at the two layers, namely r[1] = r[2] = r. Panel (a) shows the full
r − ω phase diagram where the color map encodes the average fraction of cooperators
c across the two layers. High benefits emerge only for large values of ω. Panels (b)
and (c) show the full r − ω phase diagram where the color map encodes respectively
the average coherence ξ and the absolute difference |c[2] − c[1]| between the fraction of
cooperators in the two layers. Reported dashed lines separate regions where the system
is at an absorbing state with full coherence ξ = 1 and either full defection c = 0 (IA)
or full cooperation c = 1 (IB), from the region of continuously evolving coexistence of
cooperators and defectors 0 < c < 1 (II).
effect and enhance the resilience of public cooperation expected in a system with multiple
layers of interactions. These results confirm the crucial impact of the edge overlap on
dynamical processes on networks, in agreement with previous works [80, 81].
To investigate more in details the role of the topological overlap, we consider a
multiplex with only two layers, but where the value of the edge overlap ω can be varied
continuously in the range [0, 1]. In order to tune ω we have start with a configuration
with ω = 1, where the two layers are made by the same regular random graphs with
k = 4. Keeping fixed the structure of the first layer, we then start rewiring a fraction
f of the links on the second layer, so that we result in a network with an edge overlap
equal to:
ω =
(1− f)
(1 + f)
(5)
as a function of f (see Refs. [82, 56] for details). In particular, when f = 1 and all
the links of the second layer are rewired we get with a multiplex network with no edge
overlap, i.e. with ω = 0. In Fig. 2 we report the results obtained as a function of the
two control parameters r and ω. The three phase diagrams shown encode respectively
the average fraction of cooperators c across the two-layer multiplex (a), the average
coherence ξ of the players (b), and the absolute difference between the fraction of
cooperators in the two layers, |c[2] − c[1]| (c). In panels (a) and (b), we can distinguish
two regions, namely type I where the whole multiplex reaches an absorbing phase (each
layer is either in full cooperation or in full defection), and type II where the multiplex
is trapped in a state where cooperators and defectors coexist. The two type I regions
can be further classified as type IA where defectors dominate (c = c[1] = c[2] = 0), and
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type IB where cooperators dominate (c = c[1] = c[2] = 1). In both type IA and IB
regions all the players are of course fully coherent, i.e., they adopt the same strategy on
both layers such that ξ = 1. It can be observed that the added value of the multiplex
structure in enhancing network reciprocity marking the transitions from region IA to II
suddenly decreases for ω < 0.25, disappearing as the value of the topological overlap ω
approaches 0.
Interestingly, at the II to IB transition, that is from the mixed (C + D) phase to
the pure C phase, the topological overlap does not play a role at all, indicating that the
enhanced multiplex network reciprocity is crucial only when cooperation can be barely
sustained. Even as the multiplex enters the mixed (C + D) phase, i.e., region II, the
impact of the extent of topological overlap vanishes very quickly beyond the critical
value of rc at the transition point. In the mixed (C + D) phase, we can also observe
spontaneous symmetry breaking in panel (c), where in region II |c[2] − c[1]| > 0. This
means that, even though the public goods game in both layers is characterized by the
same synergy factor and is staged on layers with identical topological properties, the
level of cooperation in the stationary state is different. In particular, it can be observed
that the lower the topological overlap between the two layers (ω → 0), the higher the
symmetry breaking, with the maximum value occurring for ω = 0 and r = G = 5.
Lastly, we study the impact of differing synergy factors in the layers forming
the multiplex in order to determine the importance of game parametrization on the
emergence of enhanced multiplex network reciprocity. In Fig. 3, we present results
separately for two-layer multiplex networks with complete (a,b,c) and zero (d,e,f)
topological overlap between the layers. The r[1]−r[2] phase diagrams encode the average
fraction of cooperators across the two-layer multiplex c (a), the average coherence of the
players across the two layers ξ (b), and the difference between the fraction of cooperators
in the two layers c[2] − c[1] (c). It can be observed that in both cases, regardless of the
overlap, region IB occurs when both r[1] > 6 and r[1] > 6 (a,d). A new region can
also be observed in both cases when r[α] > 6 and r[β] < 3.75, which we denote as IC,
where one layer is characterized by full cooperation (c[α] = 1), while the other layer is
characterized by full defection (c[β] = 0). Accordingly, we have a completely incoherent
multiplex with ξ = 0 (b,e).
These equivalences beget the question when do the evolutionary outcomes actually
differ in dependence on complete and zero overlap. As results in Fig. 3 show, and as could
be anticipated from the results presented in Fig. 2, the difference is most expressed at the
interface between regions IA and II (see dashed purple line). If there is no topological
overlap between the two layers (d,e,f), we see that as long as both r[1] < 3.75 and
r[2] < 3.75, we always have full defection in both layers. Hence, multiplexity does not
provide any advantage to the evolution of cooperation (see also Fig. 1). Conversely, when
there is perfect overlap (a,b,c), cooperators emerges already for r = r[1] = r[2] < 3.75,
roughly r ≈ 3.25 = rc. But given an arbitrary choice for r[β] that is smaller than 3.75,
is r[α] = 3.25 the minimum value to see the emergence of cooperators in the multiplex?
Indeed no, given r[β] we still see cooperators in the system as long as we choose r[α]
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Figure 3. The emergence of multiplex network reciprocity depends on the different
values of the synergy factors at each layer. The multiplex is formed by two layers of
regular random graphs with an edge overlap respectively equal to ω = 1 (a,b,c) and
ω = 0 (d,e,f). Panels (a,d) report the full r[1] − r[2] phase diagram where r[1] and r[2]
are the synergy factors at the two layers, and where the color map encodes the average
fraction of cooperators c. Panels (b,e) and (c,f) show the full r[1] − r[2] phase diagram
where the color map encodes respectively the average coherence ξ and the difference
of cooperators c[2] − c[1] in the two layers. A new absorbing state (region IC), with
full cooperation at layer α c[α] = 1, full defection at layer β c[β] = 0 and complete
incoherence ξ = 0, emerges.
such that it is slightly above r
[α]+r[β]
2
> 3.25 (linear relationship r
[α]
c = 2 · 3.25 − r[β],
see purple line). Importantly, this relation holds as long as r[β] does not go beyond
3.75, the original critical value for one layer, at which point the relation no longer holds
and the overlapping case behaves as the non-overlapping case. Based on the phase
diagrams in Fig. 3, the critical value can be approximated as r[α] ≈ 2 · rc − rc(M = 1),
which means r[α] = 2 · 3.25 − 3.75 ≈ 2.75. Taken together, a topologically overlapping
multiplex can extend the coexistence region II towards significantly smaller values of r,
which in our two-layer setup corresponds to a triangle delimited by (r[1], r[2]) such that
X = (2.75, 3.75), Y = (3.75, 3.75) and Z = (3.75, 2.75).
4. Discussion
We have studied the determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks, focusing
in particular on the topological overlap and different synergy factors across the layers.
We have shown that, if the topological overlap between the layers is sufficiently
extensive, the critical value of the synergy factor that enable cooperators to survive
decreases steadily as the number of layers increases. This result confirms the existence
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of interdependent or multiplex network reciprocity, which enhance the resilience of
cooperators beyond the bounds of traditional network reciprocity on an single-layer
network. However, we have also shown that, as the topological overlap between the
layers decreases, so do the benefits of multiplexity for the evolution of cooperation. In
particular, if the topological overlap is zero, cooperators loose all benefits stemming
from their engagement in different layers of the multiplex and thus become reliant on
single-layer network reciprocity alone. These results manifest not only in the average
fraction of cooperators in the multiplex, but also in the average coherence of the players
across all the layers. We show that, in case of perfect topological overlap, the later
reaches a minimum at ever lower values of the synergy factor as the number of layers
increases, while in the absence of topological overlap the synergy factor yielding minimal
coherence is independent of the number of layers.
By further varying the synergy factor that applies on each particular layer, we have
shown that the topological overlap is crucial only if the synergy factor on all layers is
smaller than the critical value on a single layer. If that is the case, the overlap plays
a key role in sustaining cooperation, and there exists an average value of the synergy
factor across all the layers that needs to be reached for cooperators to survive. However,
if on a single layer the synergy factor is large enough to sustain cooperation even in the
absence of multiplexity, i.e., as if the layer would be isolated, then the topological overlap
seizes to matter. By means of extensive Monte Carlo simulations, we have determined
precise bounds on the topological overlap and the relations between synergy factors in
different layers that need to be met for enhanced multiplex network reciprocity to take
effect. Taken together, our results thus establish key determinants of public cooperation
in multiplex networks.
The presented results reveal rather stringent conditions that have to be met for
public cooperation to be more resilient on multiplex network than it is on single-
layer networks. Indeed, the hallmark of multiplex network reciprocity, which is
the simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters across different layers,
requires near perfect topological overlap, and is effective only if the conditions for
cooperation on all layers are rather dire. If the coordination process leading to
the forlimation of correlated cooperator clusters is disturbed due to the lack of
topological overlap, multiplex network reciprocity never emerges, resulting in the total
collapse of cooperation across all layers minus those that would sustain cooperation
on their own either way. Thus, while multiplexity and network interdependence can
in theory be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed
by isolated networks, caution is needed against overly optimistic predictions that
suggest involvement in different social contexts alone is in itself sufficient to promote
cooperation. Enhanced prosocial behavior in layered social systems can emerge only if
the positions of the players and the links among them in these layers do not differ much.
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